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NOTES
PUBLICATION RIGHTS AGREEMENTS IN
SENSATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES: A RESPONSE TO
THE PROBLEM
I
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND A PROPOSED
SOLUTION
As a result of the increased focus of public attention on sensational
crimes,' criminal defendants may capitalize on the media interest in
their stories. 2 Publishers are often willing to pay large sums of money to
acquire publication rights3 to a defendant's life story and his alleged role
I See Fedler, When Headlines Are Bought, BARRISTER, Fall 1980, at 14 (claiming that
prior to the 19 60's media attention focused on "stories of famous soldiers, politicians and
adventurers .... During the 1960s and 1970s, the media began to buy more stories, includ-
ing stories about sensational crimes. Stories about assassinations were especially lucrative,
followed by tales of mass murders, kidnappings and million-dollar robberies.").
2 See, e.g,, S. ATKINS & B. SLOSSER, CHILD OF SATAN, CHILD OF GOD (1977) (Susan
Atkins' version of Sharon Tate murders); C. CHESSMAN, TRIAL BY ORDEAL (1955) (so called
"Red Light Bandit" recounting his wait for execution); E. CRAY, BURDEN OF PROOF: THE
CASE OF JUAN CORONA (1973) (inside account of trial of Juan Corona-provided to author
by Corona's attorney through agreement with Corona); THE DEATH PENALTY (1975) (televi-
sion movie about death penalty in which so called "Capeman" murderer, Salvador Agron,
was to receive $2,500 from the movie's proceeds); W.B. HuIE, HE SLEW THE DREAMER
(1970) (analysis of James Earl Ray's actions before and after he assassinated Martin Luther
King); R.B. KAISER, "R.F.K. MUST DIE!" A HISTORY OF THE ROBERT KENNEDY AsSASSI-
NATION AND ITS AFTERMATH (1970) (description of events surrounding Sirhan Sirhan's mur-
der of Robert Kennedy); Taking a Crininal to Civil Court, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 1979, at 22B
(parents of manslaughter victim suing to prevent possible profiting from publication rights
agreement); Selling a Client's Stop, TIME, Jan. 19, 1970, at 62 (Susan Atkins, defendant in trial
for murder of Sharon Tate, profiting from interview); Checkbookjournalism, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
29, 1969, at 45 (Susan Atkins and her interviewer profiting from sale of interview concerning
murder of Sharon Tate); Ga. Aides Oppose Atlanta Saspect's Legal Fund Plan, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14,
1981, at 2, col. 3 (attorneys trying to raise money for defense of alleged murderer, Wayne
Williams, by selling rights to his story); Weiser, Welch Says His Lawyer to Get Legal Fees From
Book Profits, Washington Post, Mar. 29, 1981, at Al, col. 5 (potential proceeds from book
contract serves as payment to attorney for defending accused murderer Bernard C. Welch);
Bushwhacked.hy a Media Mob, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 2, 1981, at 18, col. 2 (intense media interest in
alleged murderer of ex-Beatle John Lennon); Winfrey, 'Son of Sam' Case Poses Thorny Issuesfor
Press, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1977, at 1, col. I (ethical problems posed for press by coverage of
"Son of Sam" killings and alleged $50,000 to $100,000 requested for taped interviews with
alleged "Son of Sam" killer, David Berkowitz). See generaly Lieberman & Stewart, Making
Monqy OJMurder, STUDENT LAW., FEB. 1982, at 22 (discussing sales by criminals of their
stories).
3 See infaa note 4 for a discussion of the amounts paid to'defendants. The phrase "pub-
lication rights" includes newspaper, magazine, movie, television, radio, theater, photograph,
and any type of literary right.
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in the crime. The defendant in turn can use the money to pay for pri-
vate counsel, with some defendants even choosing to sell their publica-
tion rights directly to their defense attorneys as compensation for legal
services. 4
Opposition to defendants acquiring such money 5 has led twenty-
two states to pass statutes6 requiring that all funds from publication
4 Publication rights agreements have resulted in a broad range of remuneration. Be-
cause the amount of money received from such agreements usually remains private, it is diffi-
cult to determine how much is really at stake. Where a writer published three articles in Look
magazine followed by a book about James Earl Ray, see W.B. HUIE, supra note 2, Ray's first
lawyer received $25,000 from the proceeds and his second lawyer, $165,000. Ray's second
lawyer expected $400,000 but agreed to receive a maximum of $165,000 when no trial took
place due to Ray's guilty plea. Selling a Client's Stoly, supra note 2, at 62. Other high figures
include: $800,000 reportedly paid for Patricia Hearst's own story; a $225,000 contract be-
tween F. Lee Bailey and a publisher for Bailey's story about Patricia Hearst, Turner, Patricia
Hearst Drops Attempt to Win New Trial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1982, at A15, col. 1; and $180,000
reportedly paid for the right to David Berkowitz's story, Lieberman & Stewart, supra note 2,
at 25. Examples on the low end of the range include $200 paid by the New York Dail News
for copies of Berkowitz's letters to an earlier girlfriend, Fedler, supra note 1, at 15, and $350
for photographs of Wayne Williams, Lieberman & Stewart, supra note 2, at 40. As the exam-
ples demonstrate, the amount of money available varies greatly, depending on the public's
knowledge of the defendant and the particular publication rights sold.
5 The author of the New York bill prohibiting convicts from profiting from their stories
commented on the rationale behind the statute:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual,
such as the forty-four caliber killer, can expect to receive large sums of money
for his story once he is captured-while five people are dead, other people
were injured as a result of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in
all criminal situations, the victim must be more important than the criminal.
1977 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 267 (memorandum of Sen. Gold); see also
Criminals' Revenues From Stories Curbed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1977, at 20, col. 3.
The congressional conference committee report on the proposed federal version of the
New York statute exhibited the same rationale:
A number of people have expressed concern that the widespread public-
ity surrounding a crime can result in the criminal wrongdoer receiving lucra-
tive fees for books, articles, interviews and the like. These people see such
income on the part of the wrongdoer as unjust enrichment and have proposed
that such income be held in escrow by the State in order to pay claims made
against the wrongdoer by the victims of the crimes which led to the unjust
enrichment.
Victims of Crime Compensation, H.R. REP. No. 1762, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978),reprinted
in 124 CONG. REc. 35,736, 35,738-39 (1978).
6 ALA. CODE § 4-9-80 to -84 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.165 (1981); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-218 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512
(West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3401 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 401-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.7-1
to .7-6 (Burns 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Baldwin 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46.1831-3 (West 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 299B. 17 (West Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1836 to -1842 (Supp.
1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.265 (1981); N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982); OKLA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 17 (West Supp. 1982-83); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 to -59-80 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28A-l to -14 (Supp. 1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to -208 (1980); TEX. Civ. CODE ANN. §§ 10-18 (Vernon Supp.
1982-83); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200-.280 (West Supp. 1982).
This note describes the mechanics of New York's version, the first such law, passed in
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rights agreements be placed in an escrow account. The statutes gener-
ally provide that if the defendant is convicted, the victim of the crime
and his family may collect from the account; if acquitted, the defendant
receives the funds. Lawyers may draw reasonable attorneys' fees from
the account.
The Code of Professional Responsibility further restricts such
agreements. The Code prohibits attorneys from making publication
rights agreements with their clients prior to the conclusion of "the mat-
ter giving rise to [the attorney's] employment,"' 7 because of the attor-
ney's conflict of interest between maximizing publicity, and thus profit,
and obtaining his client's acquittal.8 Although generally disapproving
of such arrangements, courts have not used the Code prohibition as a
basis for reversing convictions or for invalidating a publication rights
contract. 9
Critics argue that these statutes infringe upon a defendant's first
amendment rights. 10 Because the statutes diminish the defendant's
1977. See infra note 47. The other states that have passed such statutes have generally fol-
lowed the New York scheme with some variations. See infra note 50.
7 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY DR 5-104(B) (1980).
8 Prior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employ-
ment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a
client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in publication
rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed
employment.
Id
Ethical Consideration 5-4 provides the rationale for prohibiting such arrangements:
If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to
receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to
the subject matter of the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the
interests of his client to his own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a
lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from his client television, radio, motion
picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with respect
to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of
conduct that will enhance the value of his publication rights to the prejudice
of his client. To prevent these potentially differing interests, such arrange-
ments should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects
of the matter giving rise to the employment, even though his employment has
previously ended.
Id EC 5-4; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.8(d) (Proposed Final
Draft 198 1) (substantially similar to DR 5-104(B)); cf. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 5-101 (1975) (only provision covering such conflicts of interest; no specific analogue
to DR 5-104(B)).
California is the only state that has not adopted substantially all of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Model Code, adopted by the ABA in 1970, is in force in
substantially the same form in the other 49 states. California chose to draft its own version,
which was approved by the California Supreme Court on Dec. 31, 1974, and became effective
on Jan. 1, 1975.
9 See inf/a note 29 and accompanying text. In short, the existence of the contract may
violate the attorney's professional responsibility under the Model Code but not the defend-
ant's sixth amendment rights.
10 See, e.g., Note, Compensating the Victim/rom the Proceeds of the Criminal's Sto,--Th Consti-
tutionality of the New York Approach, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 93 (1978) [hereinafter cited
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prospects for profit from his story, they discourage him from revealing
protected speech.
Both the first amendment problem with the above statutes and the
conflict of interest problem with attorney-client publication rights con-
tracts could be reduced if legislatures enacted statutes that provided for
contingent attorney's fees, setting aside a share of the proceeds for attor-
neys even if the defendant is convicted. The Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility prohibits contingent fees in criminal cases," but the main
rationale-that such agreements create no res with which to pay the
fee' 2-does not apply when publication money is available upon
acquittal.
II
THE RATIONALE FOR PERMITTING PUBLICATION RIGHTS
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
AND THEIR ATTORNEYS
The principal justification for allowing a defendant to enter into a
publication rights agreement is the defendant's freedom to contract for
the attorney of his choice. In Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 13 the California Supreme Court applied this logic in upholding a
publication rights agreement between Bobby Joe Maxwell and his attor-
ney.' 4 In the agreement, Maxwell's attorney expressly confronted the
possible conflict of interest problem by having Maxwell declare that he
was cognizant of the potential conflicts but still wished to proceed with
his chosen counsel. 15 In reversing the lower court's invalidation of the
as Note, Compensating the Vitim]; Note, Criminals-Turned-Authors." Victims' Rights v. Freedom of
Speech, 54 IND. L.J. 443 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Criminals-Turned-Authors]; Jones,
Constitutional Analysis of Statutes Requiring that Funds Received by Accused or Convicted
Criminals for the Story of their Crime be Given to Their Victims (Mar. 30, 1982) (report
prepared by Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, for Congressional Research Serv-
ice, Library of Congress) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
11 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 2-106; id EC 2-20 (1980).
12 "Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases,
largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not produce a res with which to
pay the fee." Id EC 2-20.
13 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
14 Maxwell, nicknamed the "Skid Row Stabber," gained public exposure for allegedly
killing 10 people on Los Angeles's skid row. See Rawitch, Calif. Court Upholds Removal of Law-
yers for "Stabber" Suspect; Book Deal Cited, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 25, 1980, at 7, col. 2.
15 The contract reflects extensive disclosure of possible conflicts and
prejudice. It declares that counsel may wish to (1) create damaging publicity
to enhance exploitation value, (2) avoid mental defenses because, if successful,
they might suggest petitioner's incapacity to make the contract, and (3) see
him convicted and even sentenced to death for publicity value. But a catch-
all paragraph-after reciting that other, unforseen [sic] conflicts may also
arise-reads: "'The Latuyers will raise every defense which they, in their best judgm ent
based upon their experience feel is warranted by the evidence and information at their
disposal and which, taking into consideration the flow of trial and trial tactics, is in
1983]
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agreement,16 the court held: "When the possibility of significant conflict
has been brought to the court's attention and the danger of proceeding
with chosen counsel has been disclosed generally to the defendant, he
may insist on retaining his attorneys if he waives the conflict knowingly
and intelligently for purposes of the criminal trial."'1 7 The court thus
elevated Maxwell's freedom to contract and right to the attorney of his
choice above the need to prevent potential attorney-client conflicts of
interest.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California'8
suggests a related justification for allowing publication rights agree-
ments. The Court in Faretta held that a mentally competent defendant
may waive his right to counsel and represent himself. 19  Even though
the defendant is legally untrained, he may act as his own counsel if he is
competent and chooses to do so. The Faretta holding suggests that just
as a mentally competent defendant may choose to represent himself de-
spite his lack of training, so should he be able to choose his own counsel
despite the attorney's conflict of interest. The California Supreme
Court in Maxwell noted this argument 20 and concluded that "chosen
representation is the preferred representation." '2'
A third argument favoring attorney-client publication rights agree-
ments minimizes the unlikelihood of improper representation because of
Maxwell's best interests. The Lawyers willconduct all aspects of the defense ofMaxwell
as would a reasonaby competent attorne acting as a diligent conscientious advocate."
30 Cal. 3d at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (emphasis in original).
The defendant waived his attorney-client privilege and promised to supply counsel with
extensive information about his life. Id at 610 n.1, 639 P.2d at 250 n.1, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179
n. 1. The agreement also included the names and addresses of other lawyers from whom Max-
well could receive independent legal advice. Id at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at
179.
16 Maxwell's attorneys had initially shown the contract to the trial judge. After satisfy-
ing himself that Maxwell was competent to understand and enter into such an agreement, the
trial court still invalidated the agreement on its own motion. In a two-to-one decision, the
appellate court affirmed. Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 101 Cal. App.
3d 736 (opinion omitted), 161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980).
17 30 Cal. 3d at 619, 639 P.2d at 256, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
18 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
19 In Faretta, the defendant was charged with grand theft and attempted to waive his
right to assistance of counsel. In reviewing a California appellate court holding that the
public defender must represent Faretta, the Court held that Faretta could represent himself
because he had "clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge [weeks before trial] that
he wanted to represent himself." Id at 835. Furthermore, "[t]he record ...show[ed] that
Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising
his informed free will." Id
20 30 Cal. 3d at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
21 Id The Maxwell court emphasized that the "[d]efendant's confidence in his lawyer is
vital to his defense." Id "[E]ffective assistance is linked closely to representation by counsel
of choice. When clients and lawyers lack rapport and mutual confidence the quality of repre-
sentation may be so undermined as to render it an empty formality." Id at 613, 639 P.2d at
251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
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the attorney's countervailing incentive to represent his client effectively.
A lawyer will represent his client to the best of his abilities because the
lawyer has a strong interest in maintaining his professional reputation.22
Although an attorney's self-interest might be served by heightened pub-
licity at the expense of his client, attorneys ideally will realize that their
long-term interests are best served by effective representation that en-
hances their professional reputation.23
The final justification emphasizes that such agreements do not vio-
late criminal defendants' sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. In cases where a single attorney represents more than one
defendant in the same criminal action, the Supreme Court established a
stricter standard for reversal of convictions for ineffective assistance of
counsel than a mere finding that a conflict exists.24 The Court held that
"a defendant must establish that an actual conflict adversely affected his
lawyer's performance. '25 Both courts26 and at least one commentator 27
have argued that this test should also apply to publication rights agree-
22 In the appellate court opinion affirming the invalidation of the Maxwell agreement,
Justice Jefferson acknowledged this argument when stating Maxwell's position: "[I]t is argued
that [the assumption that a defense attorney has a potential interest in having his client con-
victed] is clearly rebutted by an attorney's primary interest in maintaining a reputation of
professional excellence in his chosen career." 101 Cal. App. 735 (Opinion omitted), 161 Cal.
Rptr. 849, 853. See also United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting
that alleged conflict of interest presented by F. Lee Bailey's contract to write book on life and
trial of Patty Hearst was not total, because "salability of Bailey's book would have been
enhanced had he gained an acquittal for Hearst."); Note, Conficting Interests in Lawyer-Client
Publication Rights Agreements-The Stog of Bobby Joe Maxwell, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 869, 899
(1981) (suggesting that attorney has strong self-interest in obtaining client's acquittal).
23 The ultimate question is whether the immediate monetary benefit to the attorney
resulting from the publicity outweighs the possible long-term detriment to his professional
reputation because of reduced income from law practice.
24 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), involved representation of multiple defend-
ants in a single prosecution by the same attorney. Such representation results in the attorney
serving potentially different interests among defendants, in contrast to publication rights
agreements, which result in an attorney serving a defendant's interest that is different from
the attorney's own interest.
In United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938
(1981), the Ninth Circuit held this distinction "immaterial": "We consider the rules laid
down in Sullivan to be directly applicable to the present case. . . " Id at 1193. In Hearst,
Patricia Hearst had agreed to cooperate exclusively with her attorney, F. Lee Bailey, and to
refrain from publishing any account of her experiences until 18 months after his book was
published. After conviction, she alleged that Bailey had failed to seek a continuance or a
change of venue and had improperly put her on the witness stand to maximize publicity in
San Francisco. Even though President Carter commuted her seven-year sentence to 20
months, the court granted a new hearing to "apply to the facts the law recently laid down by
the Supreme Court in CQyler v. Sullivan." Id
25 446 U.S. at 350. For a discussion of the development of this test, see infia note 44 and
accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 938 (1981); Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 612, 639
P.2d 248, 256, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 180 (1982).
27 See Note, supra note 22, at 884.
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ments. In cases in which a conflict of interest does not rise to the level of
reversible prejudice, the existence of the conflict should be balanced
against the benefit to the defendant of obtaining private counsel of his
choice.. In view of the increasingly limited public defender resources,
and the availability of reversal for ineffective representation due to ma-
jor conflicts of interest, the balance favors permitting knowing waiver of
conflicts in attorney-client publication rights agreements.
III
ARGUMENTS FOR A PER SE INVALIDATION OF ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PUBLICATION RIGHTS AGREEMENTS
Although courts have not invalidated publication rights agree-
ments per se, 28 many courts have expressed disapproval of them.2 9 In
his vigorous dissent in Maxwell, Justice Richardson stated that Maxwell
faced "the most serious of criminal charges" and "require[d] . . . coun-
sel whose allegiance to him [was] total and unalloyed, free of the subtle,
opposing magnetic pull of self-interest or adverse pecuniary advan-
tage. . . . This self-interest . . . is ever present to sway, if uncon-
sciously, the numerous decisions of counsel both pretrial and during
trial. ' 30 A defendant who wishes to waive the possible conflicts of inter-
est of his attorney cannot foresee all the situations in which those con-
flicts may affect his attorney. In Maxwell, Chief Justice Bird asserted
that mere knowledge of potential conflicts is insufficient "to enable a
person untrained in the law to make a truly knowing and intelligent
28 The lower Maxwell courts applied a per se rule of invalidation, but the Supreme
Court of California reversed them. Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 30
Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
29 See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d at 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Moreover, all
courts before which the issue has been raised have disapproved the practice of attorneys ar-
ranging to benefit from the publication of their clients' stories."); Wojtowicz v. United States,
550 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir.) ("While we do not regard the practice worthy of emulation, we
cannot say that it rendered counsel's representation constitutionally defective."), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 972 (1977); Ray v. Rose, 535 F.2d 966, 974 (6th Cir.) ("Despite our disapproval of
such a fee arrangement, however, its existence does not necessarily mean that Ray was denied
effective assistance of counsel.'), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976); Ray v. Rose, 491 F.2d 285,
289 (6th Cir.) ("We are not willing to sanction a rule that would permit an attorney to
subordinate the rights of his client to receive fair and honest legal advice and related service
to his own selfish interests."), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); Maxwell v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (1982) ("We
stress that our opinion connotes no moral or ethical approval of life-story fee contracts.');
People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 720, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894, 915 (1978) ("[Tlhe conflict of
interest unanimously condemned by case law and proscribed by the canons of ethics resulted
in obvious prejudice to appellant. . . .');,see also Note, Confict of Interests When Attornys Ac-
quire Rights to the Client's Life Stop', 6 J. LEGAL PROF. 299, 306 (1981) (discussing several cases
in which, with only one exception, courts have recognized Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity's prohibition against publication rights agreements).
30 30 Cal. 3d at 627-28, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91 (1982) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
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decision. '31 The conflicts may be so serious or so numerous that a de-
fendant cannot foresee the legal consequences.
In People v. Corona, 32 another California Appellate Court, recogniz-
ing the potential severity of a conflict in such cases, ordered a retrial of
Juan Corona after his conviction for murdering twenty-five migrant
workers. The court found that Corona's counsel had been ineffective in
failing to investigate the case adequately and in failing to raise the de-
fenses of mental incompetence, legal insanity, or diminished capacity.
The court held that the "literary rights contract [resulted in] trial coun-
sel [who] was devoted to two masters with conflicting interests-[the at-
torney] was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best
interests of his client, the accused." 33 The lower court in Maxwell, the
Richardson dissent in Maxwell, and the Corona court emphasize that the
attorney's conflict is so overwhelming in such cases that it must taint
representation.
The Code of Professional Responsibility's prohibition on even the
appearance of impropriety 34 provides a second argument against such
agreements. The public may perceive an attorney who enters into a
publication rights agreement as more interested in personal profit from
publicity than in zealous representation of his client. In his Maxwell
dissent, Justice Richardson noted that "[a]lthough a defendant may
waive rights which exist for his own benefit, he may not waive rights
which belong also to the public generally. ' 35 Such agreements under-
mine the public's belief in the lawyer as a faithful advocate of his client's
31 Id at 624, 639 P.2d at 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Bird, C.j., dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Bird recommended that the case be remanded on the issue of whether the de-
fendant had been made fully aware of all of his counsel's potential conflicts. Id at 625, 639
P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
32 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978).
33 Id at 720, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915. Under the agreement in this case, the lawyer, Rich-
ard Hawk, "was granted exclusive literary and dramatic property rights to Corona's life story,
including the proceedings against him, in return for legal services." Id at 703, 145 Cal. Rptr.
at 903. The agreement resulted in the publication of Burden of Proof: The Case ofjuan Corona.
The court based its reversal on both the general inadequacy of representation and the conflict
of interest. The two are related here because if Corona was legally incompetent for purposes
of trial, he may have been incompetent to enter the publication rights contract as well.
This case demonstrates a problem lurking in every case involving an attorney-client pub-
lication rights contract in which the defenses of mental incompetence, diminished capacity, or
legal insanity are available. The attorney will be encouraged to avoid such defenses because
the success of the defense might imply that the defendant was legally incompetent to enter
the agreement. See supra note 15.
34 "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 9 (1980).
35 30 Cal. 3d at 634, 639 P.2d at 265, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (1982) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting People v. Werwee, 112 Cal. App. 2d 494, 500, 246 P.2d 704, 708 (1952)).
Justice Richardson entitled a section of his dissenting opinion "Erosion of Judicial and Profes-
sional Integrity." Id at 631, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193. The Maxwell appellate
court also discussed the "preservation ofjudicial integrity." 101 Cal. App. 735 (opinion omit-
ted), 161 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61 (1980); see also Note, supra note 29, at 299 (appearance of
1983]
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interest. This situation is different from the case of pro se representa-
tion,3 6 or of an attorney representing multiple defendants,3 7 because the
conflict arising from publication rights agreements falls squarely be-
tween the attorney and his client, and is based on the attorney's recog-
nized self-interest as opposed to his favoring of one client over another.
The public cannot help but view such agreements cynically.3 8 In light
of the importance of the judicial function and a public that may already
impropriety must be avoided because public's belief in fairness of judicial system is essential
to its proper functioning).
36 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
37 &e supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
38 Art Buchwald's comical portrayal of a lawyer selling out his client for the lawyer's
personal interest in a publication rights agreement reflects the skepticism with which the
public may view such agreements:
This fictitious conversation could take place in many states where a ca-
non forbidding a defense lawyer from sharing in literary rights does not exist:
"Lefty, as you know, we're in the second week of the trial, and I think
I've made a pretty strong case for you."
"I ain't complaining. You gave the D.A. a run for his money. I got a
feeling the jury is going to come back with a not guilty verdict."
"That's what my editor thinks, too, Lefty. Originally, when we worked
out the outline of the book, we thought it would make a better story if I got
you off at the end. But now that the press keeps referring to our case as the
'Crime of the Century,' we believe it would be better if you got the electric
chair."
"Are you crazy or something? Why would it be better if I got the chair?"
"It's more dramatic if, after a great defense, the jury still finds you guilty.
A 'Not Guilty' verdict makes the book anti-climactic and a big letdown, par-
ticularly if we're going for a 'Book-of-the-Month' deal."
"Wait a minute. I don't mind you taking your fee out of the literary
rights to my trial, but I don't want to fry for it."
"Listen, Lefty, when you came to me, you didn't have a dime. You chose
me because I was the best criminal lawyer in the country. But I'm not in this
business for my health. I don't want you to go to the chair any more than you
do. But if I don't make any money out of this book, I'll have wasted six
months of my time."
"Can't you figure out some other way of ending the book without me
going to the chair?"
"I could get you life, but every major Hollywood studio is interested in
making a movie from the trial. We can't make a big deal unless you get
capital punishment. My agent said the difference between you getting life
and the chair is worth half a million bucks."
"So what are you going to do?"
"I've got to persuade the jury in my summing up that all our witnesses
have been lying through their teeth, and sodiety would be much better off if
you paid the ultimate price for your heinous crime. But I have to be subtle
about it. I don't want to hurt my reputation in the legal profession."
"I think the whole thing stinks."
"Look, Lefty, I'll even throw in an appeal to the Supreme Court for
nothing for you. But my first obligation is to my publishers. After all, they're
the ones who are paying me."
"I could have done better with a public defender."
"You know you don't honestly believe that, Lefty. Have you ever heard
of a public defender who has won a Pulitzer Prize?"
Buchwald, Defensefor Dollars, Wash. Post, Apr. 14, 1981, at B1, col. 1.
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view lawyers suspiciously, 39 courts should scrupulously "[a]void [e]ven
the [a]ppearance of [i]mpropriety. ' 4°
Another reason to prohibit attorney-client publication rights agree-
ments stems from the risk of prejudice to the defendant if the jury learns
of the agreement l.4 Knowledge of the agreement could cause a juror to
vote for a guilty verdict because he may believe that an innocent de-
fendant would not enter into such an arrangement. Thus, the publica-
tion rights agreement may subject the defendant to potential jury
prejudice as well as to inadequate representation.
These risks in turn give rise to a further potential problem: publi-
cation rights agreements at the very least provide convicted defendants
with a basis for appeal on the ground that the attorney did not represent
them zealously enough.4 2 Such appeals increase the likelihood of re-
hearings, further overloading court dockets and straining the judicial
system's resources.43 They also present the difficult question of deter-
mining what constitutes prejudicial conduct in violation of the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.44 In a
time of crowded dockets, the system need not run such risks, especially
39 Seegenerally J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYER'S UNETHICAL ETHICS AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1978); Stringfellow, The Crisis of Confidence and Ethics in the Legal
Profession, 9 CAP. U. L. REV. I (1979).
40 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
41 In calling the Maxwell decision "a step backward in the development of the law of
legal ethics," Professor Patterson briefly articulated this point: "An agreement such as this is
a de facto announcement of the client's guilt; otherwise, what would be the value of his life
story?. . . If you were a jury, what would you think if an agreement like this came out?" 68
A.B.A. J. 406 (1982).
42 See, e.g., Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.) (refusing to overturn
armed bank robbery conviction even though defendant paid counsel from fund created by
selling rights to movie Dog Day Afternoon; rehearing ordered on other grounds), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 972 (1977); People v. Fuller, 21111. App. 3d 437, 437-43, 315 N.E.2d 687, 687-91 (1974)
(refusing to reverse murder conviction solely on ground of publication rights agreement).
The courts in both cases dismissed the appeals.
43 See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 739 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980) (new hearing granted
on issue of agreement's effect on counsel). Hearst settled with her attorney out of court before
the new hearing. Turner, Patricia Hearst Drops Attempt to Win New Trial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1982, at A15, col. 1. See supra note 24; see also Ray v. Rose, 491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.) (eviden-
tiary hearing granted to James Earl Ray to determine whether his counsel's literary rights
agreement precluded effective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974), new trial
refused 535 F.2d 966 (6th Cir.) (no prejudice demonstrated), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976);
People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978) (conviction overturned and
new trial ordered due to ineffective counsel).
Estimates of the cost of Corona's new trial range from three to six million dollars, making
it at least six times the cost of the first trial. See Turner, Corona Facing Retrial in Farmworker
Deaths, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1982, at A25, col. 1; Cog Seeks to Limit Murder Trial Costs, L.A.
Times, Dec. 28, 1981, § I, at 19, col. 2; New Corona TrialPut at S3 Million, L.A. Times, Oct. 3,
1980, § I, at 27, col. 4.
44 The United States Supreme Court developed the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel in the context of representation of multiple defendants. See supra note 24 and accom-
panying text. The Hearst court found the standard applicable to publication rights agree-
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when compelling arguments favor an invalidation of such agreements. 4 5
IV
RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM: "SON OF SAM" STATUTES
New York passed the first statute preventing criminal defendants
from accumulating publication fund, by recounting their alleged mis-
deeds. In response to New York City's "Son of Sam" killer,46 the New
York state legislature enacted section 632-a of the New York Executive
Code47 to preclude the "unjust enrichment" that could result from pub-
ment situations as well. See also Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 30 Cal. 3d
at 630, 639 P.2d at 262, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
In its most recent exposition of the standard, the Supreme Court held that "[iun order to
establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant. . . must demonstrate that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). The Court added, however, that "a defendant who shows that a
conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate
prejudice in order to obtain relief" Id at 349-50. But the definition of, and the distinction
betweeen "prejudice" and "adverse effect" remain unclear.
Justice Marshall's partial dissent criticized the Court's standard as "not only unduly
harsh, but incurably speculative as well. The appropriate question under the Sixth Amend-
ment is whether an actual, relevant conflict of interests existed during the proceedings. If it
did, the conviction must be reversed." Id at 355 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Justice Marshall's requirement of a seemingly lesser showing still leaves open
the question of what constitutes "an actual relevant conflict of interests." His concession that
"the Court's view and mine may not be so far apart," id at 358, highlights the difficulty of
defining and applying a standard in such cases.
45 For a response to this argument, see Note, supra note 22, at 892-93.
46 The New York press dubbed David Berkowitz the "Son of Sam" as a result of the
note left behind after the killing Berkowitz committed on April 17 signed "Son of Sam." See
Winfrey, 'Son ofSam' Case Poses Thorny Issuesfor Press, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
47 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982) provides in pertinent part:
1. Every person .. .contracting with any person or the representative or
assignee of any person, accused or convicted of a crime in this state, with
respect to the reenactment of such crime, by way of a movie, book, maga-
zine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television pre-
sentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of such
accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions re-
garding such crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to the board and
pay over to the board any moneys which would otherwise, by terms of
such contract, be owing to the person so accused or convicted or his repre-
sentatives. The board shall deposit such moneys in an escrow account for
the benefit of and payable to any victim or the legal representative of any
victim of crimes committed by: (i) such convicted person; or (ii) by such
accused person, but only if such accused person is eventually convicted of
the crime and provided that such victim, within five years of the date of
the establishment of such escrow account, brings a civil action in a court
of competent jurisdiction and recovers a money judgment for damages
against such person or his representatives.
3. Upon dismissal of charges or acquittal of any accused person the board
shall immediately pay over to such accused person the moneys in the es-
crow account established on behalf of such accused person.
4. Upon a showing by any convicted person that five years have elapsed
from the establishment of such escrow account and further that no ac-
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lication rights agreements. 48 Twenty-one other states have enacted stat-
utes that follow the New York format49 with some slight variations.50
The New York law5' provides that if a criminal defendant enters
into a publication rights agreement, the publisher must deposit the de-
fendant's profits with the Crime Victims Compensation Board.5 2 If the
tions are pending against such convicted person pursuant to this section,
the board shall immediately pay over any moneys in the escrow account
to such person or his legal representatives.
5. For purposes of this section, a person found not guilty as a result of the
defense of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 30.05 of the penal
law shall be deemed to be a convicted person.
8. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section the board shall
make payments from an escrow account to any person accused or con-
victed of crime upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction after a
showing by such person that such moneys shall be used for the exclusive
purpose of retaining legal representation at any stage of the criminal pro-
ceedings against such person, including the appeals process. The board
may in its discretion and after notice to the victims of the crime make
payments from the escrow account to a representative of any person ac-
cused or convicted of a crime for the necessary expenses of the production
of the moneys paid into the excrow [sic] account, provided the board
finds that such payments would be in the best interests of the victims of
the crime and would not be contrary to public policy. The total of all
payments made from the escrow account under this subdivision shall not
exceed one-fifth of the total moneys paid into the escrow account and
available to satisfy civil judgments obtained by the victims of the crime.
11. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, claims on moneys in the
escrow account shall have the following priorities:
(a) Payments ordered by the board or a court pursuant to subdivi-
sion eight of this section;
(b) Subrogation claims of the state pursuant to section six hundred
thirty-four of this article in an amount not exceeding one-half of the net
amount of the civil judgment obtained by a victim which is payable
directly to the victim from the escrow account;
(c) Civil judgments of the victims of the crime;
(d) Otherjudgment creditors or persons claiming moneys through
the person accused or convicted of a crime who present lawful claims,
including state or local government tax authorities;
(e) The person accused or convicted of the crime.
48 See supra note 5.
49 See supra note 6.
50 Florida provides the most notable change from the New York approach by distribut-
ing the funds differently: 25% of the fund is distributed to the defendant's dependents, up to
25% to the victims or their dependents, and up to 50% to the state for its costs in prosecuting
and imprisoning the defendant. For a discussion of the differences among the various statu-
tory schemes, see Note, In Cold Type: Statutogy Approaches to the Problem of the Offender as Author,
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1980); Constitutional Analysis, supra note 10, at 1-3, 12-13.
See also Granelli, The Notorietp-for-Profit Fight, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 7, 1983, at 6, col. 2 (discussing
California legislative proposal to use funds from publication rights agreements for state trial
and prison costs).
51 For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of the New York statute, see Criminals-
Turned-Authors, supra note 10, at 444-49.
52 Note, however, that these statutes do not prevent lawyers from entering into such
agreements. But see supra note 8.
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defendant is convicted, the board keeps the money in escrow for five
years.53 If the victims of the crimes or their families bring a civil action
during that time and win a money judgment, the Board releases the
money to them. 54 If the defendant is acquitted, the Board deducts the
attorney's fees from the escrow account and pays the remainder to the
defendant. Whether the defendant is convicted or acquitted, attorneys
may not receive more than one-fifth of the money held in escrow. 55
Although commentators have debated the constitutionality of "Son
of Sam" statutes, 56 these laws have yet to be judicially tested. Congress,
for its part, rejected a federal model of the statute because of the alleged
constitutional deficiencies.57 The primary constitutional criticism of
these statutes is that they discourage the accused's exercise of free
speech.58 By depriving the defendant of the advance normally paid by
53 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(4), supra note 47.
54 This provision helps the crime victims primarily by setting aside money that a previ-
ously indigent defendant could dissipate while his case was pending. Victims are normally
entitled to a civil judgment even after the state's criminal action, but the defendant usually
lacks funds with which to pay damages. The "Son of Sam" statutes make it worthwhile for
victims and their families to bring the tort action. Some states also provide state aid to vic-
tims of certain crimes. See generaly H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO
VICTIMS OF CRIME (1974) (detailing programs in 10 states).
55 See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(8), supra note 47. New York encountered problems with
the original formulation of the "Son of Sam" statute due to the excessive draining of escrow
accounts for attorney's fees. Ste Book Rights.. Ethical Dilemma, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 1,
col. I, at 12, col. 4 ("[C]hief counsel of the New York Crime Victim's Compensation Board
said '. . . it's not so much a question of the perpetrator being enriched as their attorneys.
The real parties at issue are the attorneys and other agents of the perpetrator.' "). In response
to this problem, New York amended the statute in 1981, limiting the defendant's attorney's
fees to one-fifth of the funds in the account. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(8), supra note 47.
56 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (attacking the statutes on first amendment
grounds). But see Note, supra note 50 (justifying statutes on comparative equity grounds).
57 Prior to the defeat of the amended H.R. 7010 on October 14, 1978, see 124 CONG.
REC. 38,277 (1978), the conference committee on the bill rejected a provision patterned on
the New York statute. The determining factor in the committee's action was the finding of
the American Law Division of the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service that
"serious constitutional issues are raised by [the New York] legislation: The main constitu-
tional issues raised concern the due process clause of the 14th amendment and the Ist amend-
ment protection for freedom of speech and press." 124 CONG. REc. 35,739 n.1 (1978).
58 Set supra note 10 and accompanying text. Because the defendant's property is subject
to a prejudgment confiscation by the Crime Victims Compensation Board without a hearing,
the statute is suspect on procedural due process grounds as well. See Note, Compensating the
Victim, supra note 10, at 99-105; Note, Criminals-Turned-Authors, supra note 10, at 462-65; Jones,
supra note 10, at 3-6. Two commentators have offered suggestions to rectify the problem. See
Note, Compensating the Victim, supra note 10, at 119-21 (suggesting application of procedural
precautions of New York attachment statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 6201-6226 (McKinney
1980)); Note, supra note 50, at 272-73 (suggesting application of guidelines from Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
Critics have suggested other less vital challenges to the statutes. They suggest that the
statutes also may be void for vagueness. Note, Compensating the Victim, supra note 10, at 111-12
(impermissible to chill speech in violation of first amendment right to disseminate informa-
tion); Note, Cnminals-Turned-Authors, supra note 10, at 462-65; Jones, supra note 10, at 9 (vague-
ness may chill willingness of publishers to enter publication agreements). But see Note, supra
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publishers to cover initial expenses59 and by reducing his expectation of
receiving money for his story,6° the statutes limit the defendant's ability
and incentive to exercise his first amendment rights. This argument re-
lies on Supreme Court cases holding that burdens on the financial ar-
rangements normally accompanying speech may be unconstitutional. 61
An indigent defendant deprived of funds essential to the exercise of his
right to speech may assert that such a statute is an impermissible restric-
tion on his first amendment rights.62
Defenders of the constitutionality of these statutes argue that the
disincentives the statutes place on a defendant's speech are not severe
enough to invalidate them.63 The statutes leave intact many free speech
incentives for the defendant. He may pay a private attorney from the
funds; he will receive any money remaining in the account at the end of
the statute's limitations period 64 or upon acquittal; he may want to pro-
vide restitution to the victims of his crimes or their families.65 Depend-
ing on the individual defendants, these incentives may or may not
outweigh the disincentives, but they do encourage the defendant to ex-
ercise his free speech rights. The statutes do not prevent a defendant
from telling his story, but merely remove one potential motive for the
defendant to do so. The argument defending the statute's constitution-
ality characterizes the defendant's speech as- "middle-tier" commercial
note 50, at 264 (arguing that statute poses no such threat because it is "very specific"). One
critic suggested that the retroactive application of the statute might violate the contract
clause. See Note, Compensating the Victim, supra note 10, at 97-99. The statute also may violate
the equal protection clause because it only compensates victims of violent crimes, not victims
of white collar crimes. Id at 118. A further first amendment objection is premised on the
impairment of the public's right to know. Because the defendant's story could inform the
public and legislators of productive ways to handle child delinquency and criminals, a de-
fendant's choice to forego exercise of free speech will deprive the public of potentially valua-
ble information. Note, Compensating the Victim, supra note 10, at 105-09. Contra Note, supra note
50, at 263-64.
59 See Note, Criminals-Turned-Authors, supra note 10, at 452.
60 See id. at 451-52; Note, Compensating the Victim, supra note 10, at 105-12, 120-21; Jones,
supra note 10, at 8-9.
61 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court held a provision of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, unconstitutional
because it limited campaign expenditures. The Court recognized that "virtually every means
of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money," 424 U.S.
at 19, and that constitutional questions are raised if an expenditure limitation prevents a
candidate "from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Id. at 21.
62 See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (holding state tax
on owners of newspapers with distribution of more than 20,000 copies per week as unconstitu-
tional "device . . . to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled").
63 See Note, supra note 50, at 257-7 1.
64 Eg., N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(4), supra note 47.
65 See Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernized, 50 MINN.
L. REv. 243, 251 (1965). Gary Gilmore also reportedly requested that a portion of the pro-
ceeds from books about him be given to the families of those he murdered. See 2 Murder
Victims Had Auch in Common, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1977, at 21, col. 4.
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speech and thus draws support from the Supreme Court cases according
a lower level of protection for such speech.66 A statute that marginally
limits a defendant's incentives to exercise his profit-motivated speech
does not rise to the level of unconstitutionality.
V
CONTINGENT FEES IN CRIMINAL CASES WITH PUBLICATION
FUNDS AVAILABLE
A. The Proposal
Although the first amendment problems with "Son of Sam" stat-
utes may not be as significant as some commentators suggest, Congress
has found them serious enough to refuse to pass a comparable statute. 67
Similarly, although the potential conflict of interest in attorney-client
publication rights agreements may not support a rule of per se invalida-
tion, the Code of Professional Responsibility bans such agreements 68
and all courts disapprove of them.69 One solution to these problems
would be to allow contingent defense attorney's fees when significant
publication funds are available. Such an arrangement would allow the
defendant to use his publication proceeds only for his defense, thus pre-
serving the accused's incentive to tell his story, with most of the money
held in escrow for the victims. 70
The defendant and his attorney would contract for the amount of
attorney's fees in case of acquittal. The contract would also set the fee if
the defendant is convicted of a lesser offense or receives a lighter prison
sentence through plea-bargaining 7 or through the attorney's arguments
66 See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (holding that ordinance prohibit-
ing door-to-door solicitations of magazine subscriptions was permissible on basis of "commer-
cial feature" of the solicitation). Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding that
attorney's offer to represent person without charge as form of political expression was pro-
tected by first amendment) with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (attor-
ney's solicitation for personal profit unprotected by first amendment). Seegenera&'y Note, supra
note 50, at 262-63 (discussing commercial speech doctrine).
67 See supra notes 5, 57 and accompanying text.
68 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 9, 29 and accompanying text.
70 This arrangement would extend the present rationale of N.Y. ExIc. LAw § 632-a(8),
supra note 47. Under that provision, up to one-fifth of the proceeds in the account can "be
used for the exclusive purpose of retaining legal representation." See supra notes 47-55 and
accompanying text. The proposal set forth by this Note would further the New York provi-
sion's goal of permitting a defendant to use the money only for his defense until the courts
resolve his guilt or innocence.
71 In United States ex rel. Simon v. Murphy, 349 F. Supp. 818, 823 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a
defense attorney and the defendant failed to account for the possibility of plea-bargaining,
rendering the attorney's "contingent fee arrangement ... valueless unless his client was ac-
quitted." The conflict arose when the attorney failed to advise the defendant of the assistant
district attorney's offer of mitigation to second degree murder in return for a guilty plea. The
proposal in this Note would greatly minimize the chances of such a conflict because the attor-
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for mitigation at trial.72 If the defendant and his attorney failed to ac-
count for the eventual result in the contract, a judge would determine
the fees appropriate to the circumstances of the case.7 3 The judge would
set the fee in accordance with the other fees in the contract, awarding
the attorney more money if the charge and the sentence were signifi-
cantly lighter than the harshest possible result and less money if close to
the harshest possible result. 74
To prevent lawyers from viewing the risks of such arrangements as
too high, the statute would also provide a fixed amount that attorneys
could receive if the defendant were convicted of the crime with which he
was charged. The defendant could bargain for a lesser amount if an
attorney would agree to it. The legislature would have to determine the
amount needed to induce attorneys to take such cases in view of the
amount that should be allocated for the victims. 75
Thus, if the defendant is convicted, the victims receive all the
money remaining in the escrow account after the attorney collects his
fee. This fee will be between the statutory amount and zero, depending
on the bargain struck between the attorney and the defendant. If ac-
quitted, the defendant would receive all the money remaining after his
lawyer collects the agreed upon contingent fee. If the defendant is con-
victed of a lesser offense or plea-bargains, the attorney would recover
fees between the previous two amounts, determined by the contract or a
judge, with the victims receiving the remainder.
In those cases where publication funds are insufficient 76 to attract
private attorneys or where the defendant cannot attract private counsel
ney's fee for plea-bargaining would be set forth in a contract or, in the absence of such a
clause, by a judge.
72 The New York scheme seems to preserve at least 80% of the publication profits for the
victims and their families even if the defendant is convicted of a lesser charge than the one of
which he was accused. See N.Y. ExFc. LAw § 632-a(3), supra note 47 (defendant gets fund
only if acquitted or if charges are dropped). The victims and their families also receive the
money if the defendant is found guilty because of a mental disease or defect. N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a(5), supra note 47.
73 Judges determine attorneys' fees in numerous other areas of the law. See generaly
Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977)
(courts employ various approaches to determine attorneys' fees, but discretion is not
unlimited).
74 A judge might also consider factors such as the number of victims entitled to the
money, the judge's evaluation of the attorney's representation in having the penalty miti-
gated, the total amount of money available, and the effect, if any, of the publication agree-
ment on the attorney's performance. Cf Berger, supra note 73, at 315-28 (discussing factors
that courts should account for in determining attorneys' fees).
75 Even though an attorney risks much time and money in preparing the defense, his
profit, if he obtains acquittal, will be determined by the risks taken. Furthermore, the attor-
ney would receive much publicity, and an exceptional performance would enhance his prac-
tice regardless of the outcome. The sensational cases might also attract well-known attorneys
who can afford an adverse verdict but who value being in the spotlight.
76 See supra note 4.
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due to the perceived weakness of his case, a "Son of Sam" statute could
still act to preserve money for the victims and their families. The legis-
lature could designate an amount 77 that the defendant's appointed
counsel could use for expert witnesses, discovery, and other matters that
may need funding in sensational criminal cases. 78 Finally, if the defend-
ant received money for a publication undertaken post-conviction, he
would still receive a percentage of the proceeds.79
B. The Advantages of the Proposal
This proposed statutory scheme provides several significant advan-
tages over either attorney-client publication rights agreements or the
present "Son of Sam" statutes. The interests of the defense attorney and
the defendant would be aligned to minimize, if not eliminate, the con-
flict of interest problem. Because the attorney's optimum financial gain
will be realized from acquittal, there is little chance that he will sacrifice
his client's defense for greater publicity. He is no longer guaranteed a
substantial sum of money even if he loses. The public perception of the
judicial process is also improved because the attorney's interests are
more nearly the same as the defendant's. Furthermore, the alignment of
interests significantly reduces the chances for a defendant to claim inef-
fective counsel. Appellate courts will be less likely to face such claims on
their already overcrowded dockets and will be spared applying the diffi-
cult standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel.
The proposal further improves "Son of Sam" statutes because the
defendant is given a greater incentive to exercise his free speech rights.
Defendants firmly believe that private counsel represent them more ef-
fectively than do public defenders.80 The proposed statute uses this be-
77 The amount would depend on the balance struck between the amount needed to
provide an incentive for the defendant to create money for his defense and the amount that
would be left over for the victims if the defendant is convicted. This amount could be the
lesser of a percentage of the proceeds and a fixed amount. The percentage would apply if
little money were available, whereas the fixed amount would apply if substantial amounts
were available. This scheme would preserve money for the victims in either case, but the
amount available for the defense would still be limited.
78 See, e.g., 6a; Aides Oppose Atlanta Suspect'r Legal Fund Plan, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1981, at
2, col. 3, at 27, col. 3 (attorneys trying to raise money for Wayne Williams's defense by selling
his story and "complain[ing] of a lack of funds to bring in expert witnesses to refute what is
expected to be highly technical evidence against their client").
79 Under N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a(l), supra note 47, a convicted person will receive no
more proceeds from a publication undertaken post-conviction than an accused. Under the
proposal, determining the appropriate percentage of money for the defendant would require
balancing the amount necessary to encourage the defendant to tell his story against the
amount to be set aside for the victims.
80 See J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
105-06 (1972) ("Nearly 80 percent of those represented by public defenders felt that their
lawyer was not on their side.'); O'Brien, Pheterson, Wright & Hostica, The Criminal Lawy"
The Defendant's Perspective, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 299 (1977) (defendants generally consider
private counsel "to be superior to both assigned counsel and public defenders').
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lief to encourage defendants to tell their stories by permitting them to
devote their publication funds to attracting private counsel. Although
not completely eliminated, the disincentives to exercising speech will be
greatly reduced. Moreover, the state may save money because the de-
fendant will be better able to hire private counsel, eliminating the need
for a public defender and reducing the likelihood of retrial and the ac-
companying exorbitant cost.8 '
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, such an arrangement
would comport with notions of justice. Should the defendant be found
guilty, most of the money acquired from the media as a result of his
crime would go to the victims, but he has still been afforded the oppor-
tunity to attract private counsel.8 2 Should he be acquitted, he has again
had the opportunity to attract effective counsel and will keep that share
of the proceeds set by the contract.
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits contin-
gent fees in criminal cases83 the rationale behind the Code's prohibition
is inapplicable to these types of agreements. The Code contends that
"[p]ublic policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in
criminal cases, largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases
do not produce a res with which to pay the fee."184 One commentator
found it "doubtful that there [was] any current law on the subject [of
contingent fees in criminal cases]." 85 This lack of current law8 6 and the
81 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
82 In her partial dissent in Maxwell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 30 Cal. 3d
606, 624, 639 P.2d 248, 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 188 (1982), Chief Justice Bird stated that
"hold[ing] any 'life story' agreement, regardless of its contents, impermissible would be to
foreclose to the indigent perhaps the only opportunity he may have to secure counsel of his
choice. At the same time, counsel should not exploit the circumstances in which the accused
finds himself." By permitting a contingent fee in such cases, the state would preserve the
indigent's opportunity to secure counsel of his choice while minimizing the risks of counsel
exploiting the defendant's circumstances.
83 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1979). See also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.5(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (de-
rived from DR 2-106(c)).
84 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20.
85 F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 52 (1964); see also E.
WOOD, FEE CONTRACTS OF LAWYERS 35-36 (1936). But cf. R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLI-
ENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 96-97 (1980) (policy prohibits contin-
gent fees in criminal cases because lawyer's temptation to act unethically is too great).
86 E.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 542(2) (1932); 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1424, at 366-68 (1962) (citing primarily cases invalidating contingent fees in
divorce cases). The few cases on the subject do not articulate a reason for the ban on such
arrangements but declare contingent fees for defense attorneys to be against "public policy."
See, e.g., Genins v. Geiger, 144 Ga. App. 244, 245, 240 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1977) ("The contrac-
tual provision which expressly provides for payment of $25,000 contingent on a disposition of
the criminal charges favorable to appellee-client is void as against public policy."); Ormerod
v. Dearman, 100 Pa. 561,563 (1882) ("[T]he alleged [contingent fee] agreement in this case to
pay for such services is void, as being against the policy of the law.'); Sf. Price v. Caperton, 1
(Duv.) Ky. 207, 208 (1864) (dictum) ("A contingent fee dependent on conviction ought never
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presence of publication money that can function as a res present a
strong case for creating a narrow exception to the ban on contingent fees
in criminal cases by permitting them when publication funds are
available.
In these cases, the Code's rationale for prohibition-lack of a res-
does not apply. In his study of contingent fees,8 7 MacKinnon8 8 states
that one reason for the prohibition comes from the "nature of criminal
practice" where "[d]efense attorneys typically seek to be paid in advance
.... After conviction. . . or acquittal, the client will. . . [not] be in
a better position to pay a fee." 89 With an escrow account created for the
benefit of either the victims of the crime upon conviction or the defend-
ant upon acquittal, such a situation does not exist: the defendant will be
in a better position to pay should he be acquitted.
CONCLUSION
A contingent fee arrangement in such cases is not without
problems. Conflicts of interest between the attorney and the defendant
are not completely eliminated, and the potential financial benefits to the
attorney could induce improper, overzealous representation.90 Neverthe-
less, the risks of ineffective representation or the defendant's perception
of ineffective representation are substantially reduced when compared
to the current situation. To the extent that the defendant's and the at-
torney's interests are aligned, contingent fee agreements eliminate the
appearance of impropriety, reduce the state's defense costs, and prevent
increased overcrowding of dockets.
Contingent fees in sensational criminal cases would also improve
the present "Son of Sam" statutes by providing the defendant with a
better incentive to exercise his right to free speech. By telling his story,
the defendant could raise money to attract private attorneys to represent
him. This incentive precludes the possible first amendment pitfalls in
the present New York statute and supplies more money for the victims if
the defendant is convicted.
Statutes confronting the problems created by public interest in sen-
sational crimes must address the following concerns: minimizing the
risk of inadequate representation, preventing unjust enrichment to a
to be permitted to stimulate assistant counsel."); Baca v. Padilla, 26 N.M. 223, 229, 190 P.
730, 732 (1920) (contingent fee forprosecutor to secure conviction held "abhorrent to the sense
ofjustice and would not ... be tolerated by any court"); Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 89,
156 A.2d 865, 868 (1959) (contingent fee to obtain pardon held unenforceable as "against
public policy").
87 F. MACKINNON, supra note 85.
88 Now Judge MacKinnon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.
89 F. MAcKINNON, supra note 85, at 52.
90 See R. ARONSON, supra note 85, at 97.
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guilty defendant, compensating victims of crimes committed by indi-
gent defendants, and protecting the constitutional rights of a defendant.
Contingent fees in sensational criminal cases best serve these multiple
interests.
Martin S. Goldberg
